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Understanding	policy	over-	and	underreactions	in
times	of	crisis
Not	all	crises	are	met	with	proportionate	policies:	there	can	sometimes	be	a	lack	of	balance	between
the	costs	of	a	policy	and	the	benefits	that	are	derived	from	it.	Moshe	Maor	sets	out	a	conceptual
toolbox	to	help	understand	these	responses.	He	argues	that	disporportionate	responses	are	not
necessarily	the	result	of	error,	but	can	be	intentionally	designed	and,	under	certain	circumstances,	be
successful	in	achieving	policy	goals.
Policy	scholars	who	are	trying	to	explain	the	policies	pursued	by	the	U.S.	Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	England,	and
the	European	Central	Bank	during	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	are	confronted	by	an	elephant	in	the	room.	The
elephant	is	labelled	disproportionate	policy	by	design.	At	the	outset,	disproportionate	policy	response	is	typically
understood	to	be	a	lack	of	‘fit’	or	balance	between	the	costs	of	a	public	policy	and	the	benefits	that	are	derived	from
this	policy,	or	between	a	policy’s	ends	and	means.	It	is	comprised	of	two	core	concepts:	policy	over-	and
underreaction.	Overreactions	impose	costs	without	producing	offsetting	benefits,	and	underreactions	provide	net
utility	(i.e.,	the	difference	between	benefits	and	costs)	which	is	smaller	than	a	counterfactual	net	utility.	Most	studies
subscribe	to	the	conventional	understanding	which	views	disproportionate	policy	response	as	a	policy	mistake	or
error.
In	a	recent	conceptual	turn	which	challenges	the	efficient	goal	attainment	assumption,	I	have	presented	a	radical
idea:	that	under	certain	circumstances,	disproportionate	policy	response	may	be	intentionally	designed,	meticulously
debated,	implemented	as	planned	and,	at	times,	successful	in	achieving	policy	goals.	Underlying	this	idea	is	a
strategic	perspective	of	policy	over-	and	underreaction	which	views	decision-makers	as	boundedly	rational
individuals	who,	in	some	contexts,	may	produce	substantially	rational	outcomes,	as	Nobel	Laureate	Herbert	Simon
has	argued.	This	may	be	the	case,	for	example,	when	decisions	involve	high	stakes,	and	when	decision-makers	are
motivated	to	make	the	right	choice.
I	have	distinguished	between	disproportionate	policy	response	by	error	(bounded	rationality)	and	disproportionate
response	by	choice.	I	have	furthermore	advanced	a	distinction	of	such	choices	between	two	disproportionate	policy
options:	namely,	rhetoric	and	doctrine.	The	repertoire	of	disproportionate	policy	options	includes	those	which	are
disproportionate	by	definition	(that	is,	there	is	a	lack	of	‘fit’	between	expected	policy	costs	and	benefits);	they	are
perceived	by	policymakers	to	be	disproportionate;	or	are	grounded	in	the	language	of	disproportionality,	for	example,
as	a	form	of	drama.
Policy	overreaction	doctrine	refers	to	a	coherent	set	of	policy	principles	which	presents	an	‘all	or	nothing’	policy
commitment	in	the	pursuit	of	a	policy	goal,	no	matter	what	the	costs	are.	The	idea	is	for	policymakers	to	use	the
state’s	power	in	a	given	policy	area	to	cognitively	and	emotionally	overwhelm	the	relevant	target	populations	in
pursuit	of	policy	goals.	A	policy	overreaction	doctrine	communicates	to	the	target	populations	and	the	general	public
that,	on	this	particular	policy	issue,	effectiveness	takes	precedence	over	policy	costs.	A	classic	example	is	the
successful	decision	made	during	the	2007-2008	financial	crisis	by	the	U.S.	Federal	Reserve,	the	Bank	of	England,
and	the	European	Central	Bank	to	follow	Bagehot’s	(1873)	doctrine	that,	in	a	crisis,	the	central	bank	should	lend
freely,	at	a	high	rate,	and	on	good	collateral.
During	a	crisis	involving	panic	and	public	fears,	assets	value	is	difficult	to	ascertain	for	use	as	collateral;	hence	the
overreaction	which	is	built	into	this	doctrine.	Indeed,	within	a	month	of	Lehman’s	bankruptcy,	Congress	passed	the
Troubled	Asset	Relief	Program,	which	allocated	$700	billion	to	address	the	banking	crisis.	Once	the	banking	sector
and	the	economy	had	stabilised,	calibration	of	the	disproportionate	policy	response	took	place.	Ultimately,	the	Dodd-
Frank	Wall	Street	Reform	and	Consumer	Protection	Act	reduced	the	amount	available	to	address	the	crisis	to	$475
billion.
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Policy	overreaction	rhetoric,	a	subset	of	policy	overreaction	doctrine,	refers	to	arguments	that	policymakers
employ	to	reach	and	persuade	the	target	populations	of	their	‘all	or	nothing’	commitment	to	achieve	their	policy	goal,
no	matter	what	the	costs	are.	This	type	of	‘crafted	talk’	may	be	used	by	policymakers	to	shape	the	‘policy	mood’.	It
may	also	be	used	to	communicate	an	implicit	message	that	policy	effectiveness	takes	precedence	over	costs.	A
classic	example	is	Mario	Draghi’s	(2012)	statement	that	“[w]ithin	our	mandate,	the	ECB	is	ready	to	do	whatever	it
takes	to	preserve	the	euro.	And	believe	me,	it	will	be	enough,”	as	well	as	his	reassertion	of	this	commitment	in	order
to	shield	the	Eurozone	from	the	2013	surge	in	U.S.	Treasury	yield.	The	successful	choice	here	has	been	to	formulate
a	broad,	qualitative,	and	not	well-specified	statement	which,	at	the	same	time,	is	overwhelming,	unconditional	and
easily	understandable	by	market	participants	and	the	public.
Policy	underreaction	doctrine	refers	to	a	coherent	set	of	policy	principles	which	presents	a	conditional	commitment
for	achieving	a	policy	goal	based	primarily	on	policy	cost	considerations.	At	the	heart	of	a	policy	underreaction
doctrine	lie	principles	for	the	use	of	limited	resources	and	restricted	government	force	in	order	to	achieve	a	policy
goal.	A	policy	underreaction	doctrine	communicates	to	target	populations	the	implementation	of	a	gradualist
approach	to	the	use	of	government	power	that	leaves	much	room	for	compromise.	A	classic	example	is	the	UK
government	no-regret	doctrine	in	its	approach	to	climate	change	adaptation,	which	focuses	on	increasing	the	nation’s
resilience	to	a	range	of	possible	futures.	In	the	area	of	flood	preparedness,	for	example,	adaptation	measures	are	not
designed	to	perform	optimally	in	any	scenario	of	climate	change	because	they	are	not	tailor-made	to	address	future
climate	variability	and	extremes.	Indeed,	policy	underreaction	has	been	evident	as	practices	adopted	have	failed	to
deliver	when	projected	climate	change	predictions	regarding	winter	floods	have	materialized.
Policy	underreaction	rhetoric,	a	subset	of	policy	underreaction	doctrine,	refers	to	arguments	employed	by
policymakers	to	reach	and	persuade	the	target	populations	of	the	former’s	conditional	commitment	to	respond	to	a
policy	problem	based	primarily	on	policy	cost	considerations.	Examples	of	such	rhetorical	positions	include	a	wish	to
wait	until	more	information	regarding	the	policy	problem	emerges;	a	desire	for	a	limited	policy	outcome	in	a	particular
policy	domain;	an	emphasis	that	policy	will	not	disadvantage	certain	actors	and/or	arrangements;	or	a	goal	of
enacting	policy	measures	that	provide	net	social	benefits	under	all	future	risk	projections	in	response	to	a	given
policy	problem.	These	arguments	communicate	to	the	target	populations	and	the	general	public	that,	regarding	the
particular	policy	issue,	policy	costs	take	precedence	over	policy	effectiveness.
Together,	these	terms	represent	a	repertoire	of	disproportionate	policy	responses.	The	usefulness	of	each	of	the
terms	lies	in	their	convenience	as	shorthand	for	the	set	of	broadly	similar	disproportionate	policy	options	that	often
dominate	the	real	and	manufactured	crisis	management	agenda	in	various	policy	domains	in	many	countries.	Each
of	the	disproportionate	policy	options	may	take	a	different	shape	and	form	depending	on	whether	it	is	designed
before	or	during	a	crisis.	The	more	time	there	is	before	an	impending	crisis,	the	more	work	can	be	undertaken	in	the
design	of	disproportionate	policy	options.
How	do	we	confidently	detect	design?	To	prove	conclusively	that	disproportionate	responses	have	been	chosen	by
design,	rather	than	being	a	product	of	error,	scholars	should	aim	at	demonstrating	that	(i)	policy	options	are
perceived	by	policymakers	to	be	disproportionate;	(ii)	policy	instruments	are	calibrated	in	a	way	that	is	highly	likely	to
produce	disproportionate	response;	and	(iii)	that	the	decision	to	design	such	options	is	carefully	thought	out,
developed	and	debated.	The	aim	is	therefore	to	gain	firsthand	knowledge	and	eyewitness	accounts.
_________
Note:	the	above	draws	on	the	author’s	published	work	in	Policy	&	Politics.
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